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Abstract: 
How do fear appeals generate persuasive force, or reasonably pressure addressees to act as 
the speaker advocates? Leading models of fear appeals provide partial answers to this question 
because they locate persuasive force primarily in internal states, such as addressees’ cognitions or 
emotions. Consequently, they omit key parts of rhetorical transactions such as the speaker, actual 
message design, and bilateral communication vectors. The normative pragmatic model proposed 
here provides a more complete account by describing persuasive force in terms of strategies 
speakers use to design fear appeals. Put simply, fear appeals are designed to (1) make manifest that 
the speaker has made a responsible assessment of potential fearful outcomes and how to address 
them; and (2) forestall criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. Persuasive force (1) is 
generated by message design features such as claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless 
addressees act as the speaker advocates, presenting grounds, and using intense language; and (2) is 
located in risks and commitments that these design features make manifest.  
 
Text of paper: 
 Broadly speaking, it seems plausible to say that fear appeals are designed to induce 
action—to generate persuasive force for addressees to act in order to avoid a fearful outcome 
(Walton 2000, 1-2, 20, 22, 143; Witte 1994, 113; Witte 1992, 329). Because a fear appeal is a kind 
of argument about harmful consequences, and because arguments about harmful consequences are 
commonplace in deliberations, fear appeals are practically inevitable in civic discourse. And, as 
some scholars have recently confirmed, making fear appeals may be appropriate in civic discourse 
(Walton 2000, 139; Pfau 2007, 228). The challenge is to explain how they generate persuasive 
force—how they reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates.
i
 The stakes are 
high; playing on citizens’ fears may result in poor decisions with dire results.  
Leading models of fear appeals have involved two kinds of approaches: social scientific 
models explain why individuals may or may not be persuaded by a message; humanistic models 
explain what kinds of messages speakers ought to design in order to meet normative criteria. The 
problem is that these models do not capture the dynamic nature of rhetorical transactions—the 
interaction--and, consequently, provide limited accounts of the persuasive force of fear appeals in 
civic deliberations. They locate persuasive force primarily in internal states, such as addressees’ 
cognitions or emotions. In doing so, they omit key parts of rhetorical transactions such as the 
speaker, actual message design, and bilateral communication vectors. The normative pragmatic 
model proposed here provides a more complete account by describing persuasive force in terms of 
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strategies speakers use to design fear appeals. Put simply, fear appeals are designed to (1) make manifest 
that the speaker has made a responsible assessment of potential fearful outcomes and how to address them 
and (2) forestall criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. Persuasive force (1) is generated by 
message design features such as claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as 
the speaker advocates, presenting grounds, and using intense language; and (2) is located in risks and 
commitments that these design features make manifest. 
To support these claims, I briefly overview how a normative pragmatic model describes rhetorical 
transactions. I then detail three leading models of fear appeals and point to characteristics of rhetorical 
transactions that they account for in a limited way or not at all. Finally I make a case for a normative 
pragmatic model of fear appeals. In discussing other models as well as illustrating and supporting a case 
for the plausibility of a normative pragmatic one, I analyze how speakers design fear appeals in an actual 
case of high-stakes civic deliberations: the 1787 debates in Virginia about whether to ratify the proposed 
United States Constitution. Since many issues debated center on the topic of harmful consequences--the 
potential harms of ratifying the Constitution or not--fear appeals are at times rampant. The three-week 
span of the debates, the almost equal support for and against ratification, and the high stakes contribute to 
the frequency and intensity of fear appeals and of comments upon making fear appeals. Because the 
debates take place within a well-circumscribed amount of time and in a well-circumscribed location, it is 
possible to track the making and discussion of fear appeals. Moreover, since the debates take place in a 
republican political institution and the subject matter involves features of a republican political institution, 
they provide insight into appropriate places for fear appeals in republican forms of government. 
 A normative pragmatic model of communication takes into account all elements of a basic 
communication scenario: speaker, speech, audience, and context. It also takes into account bilateral 
communication vectors: speaker-to-speech and speech-to-speaker; speech-to-audience and audience-to-
speech.
ii
 As a result, it describes context less in terms of external elements such as time limits than in 
terms of rhetorical elements such as presenting evidence. In other words, it describes the context 
generated just by saying something. As Goodwin (2007, 85) has put it: “We do not assume that context 
comes already organized into social forms like ‘dialogues’ or ‘critical discussions.’ Instead, we take the 
talk through which, and within which, arguments are deployed as the primary means by which people 
organize a context for their interaction.” 
Saying something enables and constrains what both speaker and audience may say, which, in turn, 
changes the context. A normative pragmatic model explains why message design features may be 
expected to reasonably pressure addressees to act as the speaker advocates; so it explains the persuasive 
force of message design features in a way that transcends wholly normative and wholly descriptive 
explanations (Innocenti 2005, 142; cf. Jacobs 2000, 264-65; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992, 6; van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs 1993, 1-2; Walton 2000, 22). In short, a normative 
pragmatic model is oriented toward describing public commitments made manifest by speaking. 
 In what follows I detail three leading models of fear appeals: the Extended Parallel Process 
Model, a classical model, and a logical model. These models omit characteristics of rhetorical 
transactions such as the speaker or message source, bilateral communication vectors, and characteristic 
message design features; and are oriented toward internal cognitions and states of mind. I illustrate 
Innocenti, Beth. “A Normative Pragmatic Model of Making Fear Appeals.” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2011): 273-90. 
Publisher’s official version: http://muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/philosophy_and_rhetoric/v044/44.3.innocenti.pdf 
Open Access version:  http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/. 
 
 3 
explanatory problems by considering how each model addresses a significant, serious charge against a 
fear appeal: it is manipulative. 
 
Extended Parallel Process Model 
A representative social scientific model of fear appeals that continues to be an important starting 
point for fear appeals research is the Extended Parallel Process Model (Witte 1992, 1994; Nabi, Roskos-
Ewoldsen, and Carpentier 2008, 191, 192; Timmers and van der Wijst 2007, 22-23; Cho and Salmon 
2006, 92). The EPPM analyzes fear appeals based on the following message components: self-efficacy, 
response efficacy, susceptibility, and severity. It models addressees’ reasoning in response to the message 
components as follows. Addressees first reason about the threat (susceptibility and severity) and then 
about the efficacy of the recommended response and their ability to perform it (self-efficacy and response 
efficacy). If perceived threat is low, then motivation to continue processing the message--and, 
specifically, to evaluate efficacy--will be low. If perceived threat is high and if perceived efficacy is 
higher than perceived threat, then individuals are more likely to engage in danger control processes to 
protect themselves and will accept the message. But if perceived threat is high and if perceived efficacy is 
low, then individuals are more likely to engage in fear control processes--attempts to control their own 
fear rather than respond to dangerous circumstances--and reject the message, perhaps with the rationale 
that the message is manipulative (Witte 1994, 115-16; 1992, 337-45). 
This model is not designed to account for the degree to which a fear appeal meets normative 
criteria--for whether an addressee’s perceptions of threat and efficacy are reasonable, for example. A 
normative pragmatic model of fear appeals, in contrast, explains message design features and the kinds of 
public responses by addressees that they enable and constrain. For example, the message design features 
speakers use to present claims about threat and efficacy may warrant a charge by addressees that the 
speaker is attempting to manipulate them. Perhaps the language used appears to be too intense or the 
evidence presented for the proximity of the threat appears to be weak. Message design features such as 
these—presenting weak evidence, using language that is too intense—may better explain an addressee’s 
charge of manipulation than the individual addressee’s cognitions about his low perceived efficacy in the 
face of high perceived threat. 
The Virginia ratifying convention debates illustrate this point. In these debates delegates charge 
opponents with using fear appeals to manipulate. For example, they say, "Are we to be terrified into a 
belief of its necessity" and "It is a groundless objection, to work on gentlemen's apprehensions" (Elliot 
1891, 285, 427; see also 54, 62, 638). But this kind of statement is not best explained as an attempt by 
delegates to control the fear they feel in response to a fear appeal made by an opponent--as an outcome of 
delegates' perceptions of low perceived efficacy in the face of high perceived threat. First, it seems as if 
perceived efficacy by any individual delegate would be high; since the vote was close--the results 
depended on about six votes (Briceland 1988, 212-13; Einhorn 1990, 148-49)--an individual delegate 
could reasonably assert that his vote may determine the outcome of the debate. Second, delegates would 
be vulnerable to criticism were they to apparently base their decision on feelings of fear instead of an 
assessment of grounds for fear. This vulnerability is made manifest as delegates call for reasoned 
deliberation. One notes, for example, that like religion, politics “is too often nourished by passion, at the 
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expense of the understanding” and another asks, “was it proper to appeal to the fears of this house? The 
question before us belongs to the judgment of this house” (Elliot 1891, 23, 42; see also 86-87, 177, 237). 
Rather than viewing accusations of manipulation as signs of cognitions about perceived threat and 
perceived efficacy, a normative pragmatic approach would view accusations of manipulation as acts by an 
addressee that a designer of a fear appeal would want to forestall. A speaker who wants to design a fear 
appeal with persuasive force—reasonable pressure to act as the speaker advocates--needs to do so in a 
way that constrains addressees’ ability to openly dismiss the appeal as manipulative. 
This brief discussion points to interrelated features of rhetorical transactions not covered by the 
EPPM. First, the EPPM does not include a speaker or message source; it covers how message 
components affect addressees’ cognitions. Second, the EPPM describes the message in relatively static 
terms--as comprising message components which, in turn, are described in terms of objects of addressees’ 
cognitions, namely threat (susceptibility and severity) and efficacy (self and response)—rather than as a 
dynamic transaction that involves strategies such as presenting evidence. Third, the EPPM does not 
account for communication vectors other than message-to-addressee. 
 
Classical model 
Two other leading models of fear appeals are designed to be normative. One may be described as 
classical since it is warranted by Aristotle’s writings and illustrated by Demosthenes’ practice. Pfau posits 
this model to address the question “What particular kinds of fear appeals are most and least civically 
responsible” (2007, 218). He proposes “an Aristotelian approach in which the structure of the fear appeal 
is [. . .] designed to open up political debate and deliberations” (2007, 220). Civic fear appeals possess 
"the following components": 
1. In reference to an object of fear that is unrecognized or underappreciated by the audience. 
2. The rhetor carries out the following steps: 
 a. Portraying the object of fear as 
  i. Painful and destructive, and 
  ii. Close at hand (spatially and/or temporally). 
 b. Constructing the object of fear as contingent rather than necessary. 
 c. As needed, cultivating the virtue courage in the audience. 
3. In order to open a space for deliberation about the range of possible actions capable of 
addressing the object of fear. (2007, 232)  
This model is intended to define an ideal; Demosthenes’ rhetorical practice is “an almost textbook 
illustration” (2007, 225; see also 228) rather than a source of or grounds for the model. Aristotle’s 
writings on rhetoric, politics, and ethics are the source (2007, 225), so Aristotelian folk psychology 
grounds it. 
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This classical model stipulates two key points at which speakers may be vulnerable to a charge of 
manipulation. First, the model stipulates that the object of fear must be unrecognized or underappreciated 
by the audience. Pfau speculates “that rhetorical intensification of already dreaded fears is almost always 
a sure sign of the very kinds of logical distortion and audience manipulation traditionally associated with 
fear appeals in political discourse” (2007, 231). Significantly, Pfau does not ascribe logical distortion and 
audience manipulation to intensification; in this model there is nothing to suggest that using intense 
language cannot be reasonable. At issue is how to decide whether intensity is manipulative or reasonable. 
One measure suggested here is located in the minds of addressees: If they recognize or appreciate the 
object of fear—if they already dread it—then it is likely that the fear appeal is manipulative.  
Another measure suggested by this classical model involves a second key point at which speakers 
may be vulnerable to a charge of manipulation: the purpose in making a fear appeal. In contrast to a fear 
appeal designed “simply to gain compliance with the message source’s recommended response,” with a 
civic fear appeal “the rhetor seeks to encourage collective foresight by way of opening up political 
deliberations regarding the object of fear” (2007, 231-32). This measure is also internal, located in a 
speaker’s ethical intent. This classical model, then, does not explain how speakers may design a fear 
appeal to avoid the charge of manipulation. Instead it stipulates what knowledge internal to addressees or 
what intent internal to speakers makes it more likely that the fear appeal meets the normative standard of 
“opening up deliberation.” Moreover, in this classical model “opening up deliberation” refers to inducing 
an internal state of mind; civic fear is “a deliberative emotion” (2007, 225). The model does not account 
for how a fear appeal may be designed to pressure addressees to make manifest that they are 
deliberating—to in fact speak. 
This stipulation of a speaker’s intent excludes additional or alternative purposes for which 
speakers may design fear appeals at all and as they do. For example, this classical model defines away an 
ordinary understanding of why speakers make fear appeals: to gain compliance with a recommended 
response. In addition, consider reasons delegates give for making fear appeals in the Virginia ratifying 
convention debates. Making fear appeals may be a way to make it "known that my opposition arose from 
a full persuasion and conviction of its being dangerous to the liberties of my country" (Elliot 1891, 643). 
Other things being equal, making manifest a responsible assessment of the grounds for fear enables the 
delegate to avoid criticism for, say, his vote being based on local interests or outside influence (e.g. Elliot 
1891, 7, 177, 182, 237, 356, 364). Making fear appeals may also be a way for delegates to make manifest 
that they are fulfilling their duties as representatives. Delegates say, for example, that they are 
representing the interests of some portion of the public: “I represent their feelings when I say that they are 
exceedingly uneasy at being brought from that state of full security, which they enjoyed, to the present 
delusive appearance of things” (Elliot 1891, 21; see also 63). Or they refer to a broader audience when 
they say that posterity "will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty" and that they "wish 
to hand down to posterity my opposition to this system, [so] I conceive it to be my duty to declare the 
principles on which I disapprove it, and the cause of my opposition" (Elliot 1891, 56, 637; see also 642, 
652). By making manifest a responsible assessment of the circumstances, they attempt to avoid criticism 
for shirking their duties; they make manifest an attempt to “discharge their duty with fidelity and zeal” 
(Elliot 1891, 14). In fact, this helps to explain why delegates make fear appeals at all—why they do not 
simply cast a vote—when doing so may make them vulnerable to criticism for fear-mongering or poor 
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judgment. If they remain silent, they risk criticism for failing to warn about potential harmful 
consequences. 
This discussion points to features of rhetorical transactions not covered by this classical model. 
First, this classical model does not cover a range of purposes speakers may have for making fear appeals, 
including the basic purpose of gaining compliance. Second, this classical model describes the message in 
relatively static terms of individuals’ cognitions about message components: recognizing or appreciating 
an object of fear; perceiving it as painful, destructive, close at hand, contingent; feeling courage. Even the 
ideal outcome of the fear appeal—opening deliberations regarding an object of fear—involves inducing a 
state of mind or emotional disposition (Pfau 2007, 233). Third, this classical model covers unilateral 
communication vectors only: speaker-to-message and message-to-addressee. A model that incorporates 
the message-to-speaker vector would be able to account for “rhetorical intensification” as relatively 
manipulative or not based not on what the speaker believes about what addressees recognize or appreciate 
about the object of fear but on openly undertaken, public commitments that using intense language makes 
manifest to addressees. In addition, an audience-to-message vector would incorporate a judgment about 
whether the message is designed in a way that constrains addressees from openly dismissing the appeal as 
manipulative; such a judgment would not depend on an audience’s state of mind but on message design 
features. 
 
Logical model 
A second normative model of fear appeals may be described as logical. I focus on Walton’s 
model because it is representative of a logical approach and is the most comprehensive treatment of fear 
appeals in argumentation theory research (see also Pinto 2004, 261, 269). Walton’s model comprises an 
underlying practical inference structure that critics use to evaluate the logical cogency of fear appeal 
arguments. 
1. If you (the respondent) bring about A, then B will occur. 
2. B is a very bad outcome, from your (the respondent's) point of view (or interests). 
3. B is such a bad outcome that it is likely to evoke fear in you (the respondent). 
Therefore, you (the respondent) should not bring about A. (2000, 200) 
Critics evaluate this inference structure by considering the acceptability of the premises and by asking 
critical questions such as whether there is a better way of avoiding the bad outcome (2000, 130; see also 
138). They assess relevance by considering the type of dialogue--e.g., persuasion, negotiation, 
deliberation, eristic--in which the fear appeal is made (2000, 145; see also 177, 180, 203). Evaluation is 
based on whether the argument facilitates or impedes the goal of the dialogue. This may not be a simple 
task since actual rhetorical practices may not fit squarely into any single dialogue type. For example, 
Walton notes that a political debate "can involve persuasion dialogue, negotiation dialogue, deliberation, 
and eristic dialogue, all in the same case" (2000, 182; see also 198-99) and advises critics to not 
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"condemn all ad baculum arguments on the grounds that they are irrelevant in a critical discussion or 
informed deliberation of political issues" (2000, 199).  
Although the logical model is designed to represent “the cognitive component in how [fear appeal 
arguments] work to persuade” (2000, 23), Walton describes the model in dynamic terms: “[t]he structure 
is of such a kind that there has to be a sender and a receiver of the argument” (2000, 131). For example, 
he observes that “if the respondents get any sense that the probability of the threatening outcome is being 
exaggerated, they will use that as an avenue to escape from the pressure of the argument” (2000, 193; see 
also 1996, 312). Walton amplifies: 
By putting the argument in the form of a practical inference, the speaker tightens a kind of logical 
net around the hearer. [. . .] The question then posed is how the hearer can wriggle out of this net by 
challenging the premises, or finding some weakness in the linkage whereby the premises force the 
conclusion drawn in the argument. The hearer needs to respond to this logical argument by 
examining, or critically questioning its strong or weak points as a practical inference. The speaker 
and hearer can be seen as engaging in a kind of logical dialogue with each other. This theory 
represents a logical model of how the two parties are reasoning with each other in an orderly and 
structured way that represents a kind of practical rationality. (2000, 131)  
The model prescribes “how each agent should reason . . . [and] react” (2000, 132). It also treats the 
emotion of fear as a source of the force of the appeal; “[t]he key mechanism is that the situation cited is 
supposed to be so fearful that it overcomes the inertia of the respondent in taking an action that requires a 
certain effort or cost on his part” (2000, 144). 
 This model is designed to help critics assess logical cogency and does just that and more as it 
begins to capture the interactive nature of rhetorical transactions. But in focusing on logical cogency only, 
it elides message design features other than logical cogency. As a result, it omits features that may 
comprise fear appeals such as using intense language; and it explains the persuasive force of fear 
appeals—why addressees may be reasonably pressured to act as the speaker advocates--in terms of logical 
cogency only. Logical cogency ought to generate persuasive force; and it is possible for a speaker to 
design a fear appeal in just the form of the underlying practical inference structure. But, based on the 
Virginia ratifying convention debates and civic deliberations generally, just that presentational design is 
atypical. A normative pragmatic model of fear appeals accounts for the actual presentational design—
including but not only manifestations of logical cogency—and in doing so explains why a message design 
feature like using intense language can be reasonably expected to generate persuasive force (Innocenti 
2005, 144-45; Jacobs 2000, 263). 
 
Normative pragmatic model of fear appeals 
 The following discussion is organized around characteristic design features of fear appeals: 
claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates, presenting 
grounds, and using intense language. These actions make manifest public commitments which, in turn, 
alter the context such that speakers and addressees are enabled and constrained in what they may 
subsequently say. I explain how each message design feature may reasonably pressure addressees to act 
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as the speaker advocates. The explanation comprises practical reasoning on both sides of the 
transaction—speaker and addressee—and bilateral communication vectors that account for why speakers 
may reasonably expect strategies to pressure addressees to act. Underlying normative pragmatic models is 
a philosophy of language that involves describing theoretical models in terms of practical reasoning. 
These models do not purport that speakers in fact are actually reasoning in just the way described by the 
model (e.g., Kauffeld 2001). Likewise, the normative pragmatic model of fear appeals proposed here aims 
to account for message design features rather than make claims about what thoughts are consciously in a 
speaker’s or addressee’s mind (see also Goodwin 2001, 38-39; Kauffeld 2009, 240 n. 2). The normative 
pragmatic model of fear appeals is based on what delegates say about their own and other delegates’ fear 
appeals. 
At the core of a fear appeal is claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees 
act as the speaker advocates. For example, opponents of ratification make statements such as: "If a wrong 
step be now made, the republic may be lost forever" and "If you attempt to force it [the proposed 
Constitution] down men's throats, and call it union, dreadful consequences must follow" (Elliot 1891, 22, 
159; see also 44, 46, 50-51, 57, 149, 151, 378, 452, 527, 591). Proponents make statements such as "Our 
state vessel has sprung a leak; we must embark in a new bottom, or sink into perdition" and "If, in this 
situation, we reject the Constitution, the Union will be dissolved, the dogs of war will break loose, and 
anarchy and discord will complete the ruin of this country" (Elliot 1891, 106, 603; see also 37, 66, 70, 74, 
90, 116, 132, 189, 329). 
Why would a delegate claim that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he 
advocates? Why not simply cast a vote? By remaining silent, a delegate risks criticism for failing to warn 
about potential harms and, in doing so, failing to fulfill his duties as an elected representative. As noted 
above, delegates provide just these kinds of reasons for why they make fear appeals. To avoid these kinds 
of criticism, a delegate may state potential harmful consequences of not acting as he advocates. 
But claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates carries 
risks of criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. The following disclaimers point to delegates’ 
awareness of these risks: "I do not wish to frighten the members into a concession of this power, but to 
bring to their minds those considerations which demonstrate its necessity" and "This is not calculated to 
rouse the fears of the people. It is founded in truth" (Elliot 1891, 249, 313). It is just these kinds of risks 
openly undertaken by a speaker as he claims that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act 
as he advocates that generate persuasive force for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Disclaimers 
of this kind make manifest that the speaker knowingly undertakes risks and considers how addressees 
may publicly reason about his own reasoning or, put differently, what the message design enables 
addressees to say. Other things being equal, addressees may reason—may say—that the speaker would 
not risk criticism unless he had made a responsible effort to assess the circumstances; they see him risk 
criticism and see that he sees the risks, so the speaker’s act of claiming that harmful consequences will 
occur unless addressees act as he advocates creates a practical reason for addressees to do just that. This 
practical reason is a component of persuasive force—reasonable pressure to act. 
Another component of persuasive force is the risks for addressees created by this same strategy of 
claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates. Claiming 
that harmful consequences will occur constrains addressees’ ability to say they did not think potential 
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harms would result from not acting as the speaker advocates because, other things being equal, saying so 
would put them at risk of criticism for irresponsible or poor judgment. It would be a fallible sign that they 
were not listening to the deliberations and, consequently, not making a well-informed decision. To avoid 
such a risk, they can act as he advocates. Of course it is also possible for them to avoid such a risk by 
arguing—by making a case that harms are unlikely, for example, or that the speaker’s recommended 
action is not the best way of avoiding them. The circumstances of the Virginia ratifying convention 
guaranteed that addressees would easily be able to avoid risks created just by claiming that harmful 
consequences would occur unless addressees act as the speaker advocates; delegates had time and the 
institution had procedures to challenge opposing arguments. For these reasons, as a speaker claims that 
harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as he advocates in order to forestall criticism for 
failing to warn, so he continues to design the fear appeal in such a way as to forestall criticism in other 
areas such as whether grounds for fear exist at all and, if so, to what extent. As one delegate puts it, “Till 
they tell us the grounds of their fears, I will consider them as imaginary” and, as another responds, “I shall 
not rest content with asserting—I shall endeavor to prove” (Elliot 1891, 48, 71). 
Based on this analysis, it is predictable that another characteristic feature of making fear appeals 
with persuasive force is presenting grounds. In the Virginia ratifying convention debates, for example, 
delegates make statements such as: "When we take a more accurate view of the principles of the Senate, 
we shall have grounds to fear that the interest of our state may be totally neglected;" "I have every reason 
for determining within myself that our rejection must dissolve the Union; and that that dissolution will 
destroy our political happiness;" "Contemplate our situation deliberately, and consult history; it will 
inform you that people in our circumstances have ever been attacked, and successfully: open any page, 
and you will there find our danger truly depicted;" "This altercation terminated in the dissolution of their 
union. From this brief account of a system perfectly resembling our present one, we may easily divine the 
inevitable consequences of a longer adherence to the latter;" and “If this Constitution were safer, I should 
not be afraid. But its defects warrant my suspicions and fears” (Elliot, 1891, 221, 68, 74 [see also 7]; 133, 
641). 
How does presenting grounds for fear generate persuasive force? Why may speakers expect this 
strategy to reasonably pressure addressees to act as they advocate? As was true for stating potential 
harmful consequences, presenting grounds carries risks of criticism for poor judgment or fear-mongering. 
Speakers make manifest that they knowingly undertake these risks when they say, for example, "that I 
may not be charged with urging suppositions, let us see what ground this stands upon, and whether there 
be any real danger to be apprehended;" "Perhaps the same horrors may hang over my mind again. I shall 
be told I am continually afraid: but, sir, I have strong cause of apprehension;" “My fears are not the force 
of imagination; they are but too well founded.” "I hope that my fears are groundless;" "many horrors 
present themselves to my mind. They may be imaginary, but it appears to my mind to be the most 
abominable system that could be imagined" (Elliot 1891, 12, 47, 141, 282, 327). Again, it is just the risk 
of these kinds of criticism manifestly undertaken by a speaker when he presents grounds that generates 
persuasive force for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. Making manifest that he knowingly 
accepts risks of criticism for poor judgment and fear-mongering when he presents grounds again shows 
that he considers how addressees may publicly reason about his own reasoning—about what they may say 
about his appeal. The appeal is designed in a way that enables addressees to say that the speaker would 
not risk the criticism that the act of presenting grounds makes him vulnerable to unless he had made a 
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responsible effort to collect and assess grounds for fear. Thus presenting grounds creates a practical 
reason—in addition to the grounds themselves—for addressees to act as the speaker advocates. This 
practical reason is a component of the persuasive force generated by the strategy of presenting grounds. 
Another component of the persuasive force generated by this strategy is the risks created for 
addressees. Presenting grounds constrains addressees’ ability to say they do not see grounds for fear. This 
ability is further constrained as delegates make manifest what they “see” and have “examined,” and as 
they say that opponents cannot fail to see grounds they have presented (e.g., Elliot 1891, 187, 191, 243, 
303, 354, 396, 436, 470, 473-74). Other things being equal, addressees saying they do not see grounds for 
fear would be a fallible sign that they were not paying attention to the deliberations or that they do not 
recognize good grounds—both of which would make them vulnerable to criticism for shirking or failing 
in their duties as representatives. To evade this risk, they can act as the speaker advocates. They may also 
attempt to evade it by arguing—by making a case, for example, that the grounds do not exist or are not as 
dangerous as the speaker suggests. Since the circumstances of the Virginia ratifying convention debates 
made these kinds of evasive maneuvers likely, a speaker would want to constrain addressees’ ability to 
make them. The stronger the presentation of grounds, the more difficult it is for addressees to say that 
grounds for fears are weak without risking criticism, and therefore the more persuasive force the fear 
appeal has—the more it constrains addressees to either act as the speaker advocates or manifest the 
comparable rationality of their position or, put differently, to deliberate well. 
A third characteristic feature of fear appeals is intensity. Speakers may design fear appeals of 
varying intensity by attending to word choice, syntax, and broader units of composition. In the Virginia 
ratifying convention debates, Patrick Henry makes the most intense fear appeals in terms of quantity and 
quality. Examples of Henry’s intense language include the following: proponents of the proposed U.S. 
Constitution are trying to force the document "down men's throats;" there is nothing in the constitution to 
prevent the federal sheriff "from sucking your blood;" the state sheriffs are "unfeeling blood-suckers" 
who have "committed the most horrid and barbarous ravages on our people;" “Away with your President! 
we shall have a king; the army will salute him monarch; your militia will leave you, and assist in making 
him king, and fight against you; want what have you to oppose this force? What will then become of you 
and your rights? Will not absolute despotism ensue?” and “I see the awful immensity of the dangers with 
which it is pregnant. I see it. I feel it. I see beings of a higher order anxious concerning our decision” 
(Elliot 1891, 159, 57-58, 59-60, 625; see also 448-49). 
Levels of intensity may range from low to high. At issue is what level of intensity is appropriate. 
Certainly speakers are vulnerable to criticism for designing fear appeals that are short or long on intensity, 
and these assessments are based on all elements in rhetorical transactions, including the point in a speech 
or broader public controversy at which the fear appeal is made, the audience, the subject matter, and the 
occasion (Innocenti 2006, 337; Jacobs 2000, 263). In the Virginia ratifying convention debates, delegates 
target Henry’s intense fear appeals with criticism including: he has “entertained,” “frightened,” and 
“exclaimed, with uncommon vehemence,” but his argument appears “inconclusive and inaccurate;” they 
admire “his declamatory talents; but I trust that neither declamation nor elegance of periods will mislead 
the judgment of any member here, and that nothing but the force of reasoning will operate conviction;” he 
has “discarded, in a great measure, solid argument and strong reasoning, and has established a new 
system of throwing those bolts which he has so peculiar a dexterity at discharging;” and “the rhetoric of 
the gentleman has highly colored the dangers of giving the general government an indefinite power of 
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providing for the general welfare” (Elliot 1891, 98, 101, 104, 177 [see also 383], 466). Certainly using 
intense language makes speakers vulnerable to criticism for manipulating rather than arguing. Even Henry 
charges opponents with presenting “dangers of a very uncommon nature. I am not acquainted with the 
arts of painting. Some gentlemen have a peculiar talent for them. They are practised with great ingenuity 
on this occasion” and asserts: “it is the fortune of a free people not to be intimidated by imaginary 
dangers. Fear is the passion of slaves” (Elliot 1891, 153-54, 140). 
Perhaps intensity more than other design features carries risks of criticism for fear-mongering. 
This accounts for why, with occasional exceptions, intensity is not a message design feature delegates 
typically employ in making fear appeals. But why Henry chooses to make highly intense fear appeals may 
be gleaned from the following disclaimer: "My sentiments may appear extravagant, but I can tell you that 
a number of my fellow-citizens have kindred sentiments, and I am anxious, if my country should come 
into the hands of tyranny, to exculpate myself from being in any degree the cause, and to exert my 
faculties to the utmost to extricate her" (Elliot 1891, 176; see also 56). He even goes so far as to assert 
that "conscious rectitude" both compels him to state his fears of the proposed Constitution even though 
these appeals have lead opponents to charge him with being a demagogue and, in these circumstances, 
consoles him (Elliot 1891, 45, 54). He makes manifest that he knowingly accepts the risk of criticism and 
in doing so creates a practical reason for addressees to act as he advocates. Intensity changes the 
rhetorical context such that addressees may publicly reason that he would not risk criticism unless he had 
made a responsible effort to assess grounds for fear and to act in accordance with that judgment and with 
his duty as a representative. Thus intensity lends persuasive force to the fear appeal. But the risks incurred 
by using this strategy also help to explain why Henry interjects his own character into his rhetoric more so 
than other delegates.
iii
 The greater the intensity of the fear appeal, the more vulnerable he is to the change 
of manipulation, so the more reason to make manifest that he accepts accountability for the veracity and 
proportion of his fear appeals. 
At the same time, intensity creates some risk for addressees. Other things being equal, intensity 
makes it more difficult for them to say, for example, that they did not see potential harms or the severity 
of the threat. To avoid this risk, they can act as the speaker advocates, or argue. But since intensity creates 
a context in which addressees may charge a speaker with manipulating rather than reasoning—and 
especially in this case where the norm of deliberating reasonably was made manifest—this design feature 
pressures addressees to manifest rationality—to demand that the speaker do so and to do so themselves. 
And thus an apparently manipulative appeal may create conditions for better deliberation even if its 
persuasive force is weak. 
 
Conclusions 
 The normative pragmatic model of fear appeals proposed here begins with characteristic design 
features of fear appeals—claiming that harmful consequences will occur unless addressees act as the 
speaker advocates, presenting grounds, using intense language—and comprises complex, interlocking 
practical reasoning that explains why these message design features reasonably pressure addressees to act 
as the speaker advocates or, in other words, why they generate persuasive force. It incorporates basic 
elements of rhetorical transactions—speaker, speech, audience, and context—and bilateral 
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communication vectors. It transcends the normative-descriptive divide as it accounts for why what is 
normative has persuasive force. It provides an account of how to generate good deliberation that does not 
depend on the good will of either speaker or addressees; it explains how even reluctant or adversarial 
addressees acting in self-interest only may be reasonably pressured to deliberate well. 
This analysis explains how speakers who make fear appeals deploy and maintain rhetorical 
norms. External factors such as educating citizens in critical thinking and having a free press that serves 
as a watchdog may help to cultivate rhetorical norms. This analysis explains how rhetorical practices may 
also be self-regulating; it suggests that when the practitioners hold themselves and each other accountable 
for the veracity and proportion of their claims, they design fear appeals with more persuasive force. So 
fear appeals that feature accountability have an important place in republican forms of government. 
 
Notes
                                                          
i
 On this sense of “persuasive force,” see for example Goodwin 2001; 2002, 91-94; Innocenti 2005, 140-42; 
and especially Kauffeld 1995, 1998. 
ii
 Two foundational cases for the desirability and benefits of including all of these elements in rhetorical 
theories are Burke 1969 and Black 1978. This essay makes a case for the superior explanatory power of a model of 
civic fear appeals that encompasses these elements compared to models of fear appeals that do not. 
iii
 See for example Elliot 1891, 23, 44, 45, 47, 50, 54, 56, 137, 151, 546, 592. Randolph is the proponent of 
the proposed Constitution who makes the most intense fear appeals, and he too frequently interjects his character 
into his rhetoric; but he also needed to defend his record since he previously publicly opposed the Constitution (e.g., 
Elliot 1891, 24-27, 65-68, 85-86, 189. 
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